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Abstract
Humans are limited in their capacity to process information about the environment; to choose the
most salient details to process, we have to make rapid value appraisals and prioritize our
attentional resources. In this proposed study, it is expected that attention is required to learn from
affective information. Learning is measured by the difference between update (the difference
between the first and second estimation) and the estimation error (the difference between the
average likelihood and the first estimation). Using a belief-updating paradigm, participants will
be asked to estimate their likelihood of encountering a negative event, once before and once after
they receive the average likelihood information. By comparing the difference in estimations after
being exposed to desirable or undesirable information and a positive or negative reinforcer
across three levels of attentional load, the effects of attention on learning from affective
reinforcement can be examined. It is proposed that attention mediates learning from affective
information. This is demonstrated by the failure to learn differentially from affective information
under high attentional load, while in a no load condition participants will learn differentially
according to the type of news and affective reinforcer that they receive. The expected result
would indicate that attention is a necessity for optimal learning outcomes, especially when
learning from affective information. This has implications in the effectiveness of communicating
affective information, such as in the health care field.
Keywords: Optimism Bias, Attention Modulation, Affective Reinforcement, Learning
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Learning Requires Attention for Binding Affective Reinforcement to Information Content
“Look on the bright side,” - a common consoling advice given to someone who is in the
midst of a difficult situation. The nature of this advice implies that life ought to be full of
positive events, which is a puzzling attitude given the reality of the world. It is theorized that this
optimistic tendency is caused by a selective bias to learn better from desirable information
compared to undesirable information. Due to a limited capacity in our ability to process
information, attention is necessary to select the most pertinent details; furthermore, the valuation
of information also contributes to the selection process. Currently, it is unknown whether
attention is needed to process affective information. This study proposes that straining visual
attention will result in a failure to process both information and the affective tag, leading to a
failure to learn from affective information. As such, when there is no attentional load,
participants will learn differentially according to the type of information (desirable or
undesirable) and affective reinforcer (positive or negative) that they receive. In a high attentional
load condition, which is categorized by the strain of peripheral vision, participants will fail to
learn from the affective information. Differential learning under no attentional load is expected
because the optimistic learning bias posits that people learn better from desirable than
undesirable information, and past studies have shown that people learn better under positive
reinforcement compared to negative reinforcement. As value assignment of information
primarily operates through visual attention, straining visual attention will result in the inability to
assign an affective value to information. By using a belief-updating paradigm where participants
are asked to estimate their likelihood of experiencing a negative event once before and after
receiving the average likelihood information of the event, a comparison between estimations
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after being exposed to desirable or undesirable information and a positive or negative reinforcer
across three levels of attentional load can be made.
Unrealistic optimism refers to the tendency of believing that the future is much brighter
for us than for others, but as this is statistically impossible and without warranted evidence to
prove that the future is positive, such optimism is often termed as unrealistic. Unrealistic
optimism appears to extend into many situations involving risk perception and behavior; college
students underestimate their chances of contracting sexually transmitted diseases (Brown, 1999),
smokers underestimate their health risk (Weinstein, Marcus & Moser, 2007) and we generally
overestimate our abilities, life expectancy (Puri & Robinson, 2007) as well as success in the job
market (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). Research on unrealistic optimism is often applied to fields
concerning risk perception and behavior, as optimistically believing that one is invulnerable to
risk would cause a lack of preventative action. This is especially emphasized in health
psychology (Weinstein, 1999) where researchers are worried about individuals underestimating
their chances of contracting a disease that could have been avoided by some preventative
measure. If we can understand the underlying mechanism through which optimism operates and
its influence on judgment in risky situations, then it would be possible to avoid unnecessarily
risky actions by communicating information effectively.
Tali Sharot and her colleagues have suggested that general optimism is facilitated by an
unconscious selective learning bias known as the optimism bias. This bias is the tendency to
learn from and use more desirable information in our judgment than undesirable information
(Sharot, 2011) and will be referred to in this paper as the optimistic learning bias. Unlike the
simple prediction and comparison method commonly used in studies on unrealistic optimism,
studies on the optimistic learning bias focus on the robustness of learning from desirable or
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undesirable information and influencing factors that contribute to this bias. Past research suggest
that affective reinforcers, which are stimuli that have some rewarding or negative valuation, can
influence the optimistic learning bias by either stimulating or inhibiting the amount by which one
updates their beliefs. However, there appears to be a discrepancy in the amount of attention
needed to process the affective reinforcers as a consequence of additional visual stimuli based on
a past study (Foo, 2014). In this proposed study, the effects of attentional load on affective
reinforcement in learning and its implications will be examined.
Humans are persistently optimistic about their future. For example, newlyweds
underestimate their likelihood of undergoing a divorce, despite evidence indicating that divorce
rates are increasing in the Western world (Amato, 2010). Being an expert on the subject matter
does not exempt us from this phenomenon; divorce lawyers hugely underestimate their own
chances of getting a divorce (Baker & Emery, 1993). Despite the distorted perception of our
future, more importantly, being optimistic motivates people to continue living and trying harder
to achieve their goals through a positive belief in the future, making it adaptive and beneficial.
For example, being optimistic about one’s professional trajectory can result in an optimist
working harder and earning more (Puri & Robinson, 2007), while having a positive outlook on
life is important for self-efficacy (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Optimism and its adaptive nature is
therefore important for ensuring that individuals are resilient against negative events, as well as
encouraging exploration of future opportunities even if one experiences setbacks. Suffice to say
that without optimism, progress will stagnate because there will be no motivation to continue
working towards a goal.
While there is no set definition of what optimism is, a key element that is generally
agreed upon is the inclination for people think that they are more likely to encounter positive
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events as well as less likely to encounter negative events compared to the average person
(Weinstein, 1980). At the heart of the debate whether optimism is unrealistic or not are the two
differing perspectives of probability: the Frequentist and the Bayesian. The objective Frequentist
perspective, which is rooted in the physical properties of events occurring, assumes that
probability is simply the frequency of some phenomenon. As such, Frequentists believe that it is
irrational to pre-assign a probability to an event because all events occur at a stable and persistent
rate in the long run. In most unrealistic optimism studies where individuals are asked to predict
the likelihood of future events happening to them in comparison to the average person, a
Frequentist approach is used.
Smaller samples tend to enhance differences between outcomes because minorities are
underrepresented, thus skewing the distribution. Noting the statistical discrepancies in unrealistic
optimism studies due to smaller samples, Hahn (2014) argues for the use of Bayesian probability
in considering what constitutes as rationality. Rationality is the quality of being reasonable based
on valid facts, which implies that one’s behavior is aligned with their reasons. Bayesian
probability represents a state of knowledge or belief, which is when people assign a probability
to an event occurring based on their knowledge. If an individual only has their past experience to
base their expectations on for future events, then this thought process is entirely rational
according to Bayesian theory because it is a logical extension of knowledge. These “priors”, or
one’s optimistic experiences, can cause a multitude of problems, especially since most studies
use Westerners as their default sample. Westerners, when comparing themselves to the rest of the
world, perceive that they are generally much better off in the quality of life and the events that
they experience (Chang, Asakawa & Sanna, 2001). While it may be a cultural difference in that
Eastern cultures do not see positive events as desirable as in Western cultures (Miyamoto &

ATTENTION BINDS AFFECTIVE REINFORCEMENT TO INFORMATION

10	
  

Xiaoming, 2011), this could account for the Western self-perception as being more likely to
encounter positive events compared to the rest of the world, and in turn be the reason for the
general trend of rating oneself better than the general populations.

Optimism
Early research suggested that optimistic tendencies were evidence of defensiveness or
wishful thinking meant to produce positive feelings (Weinstein, 1980), which is due to
individuals being motivated to feel satisfied with their lives. One would be defensive if their
sense of self was being attacked, and as optimistic beliefs are fairly impervious to change,
individuals protect their self-image through optimism. Lacking complete information,
individuals tend to be unrealistically optimistic when they assess risk. This lack of information
carries over when judging the base rate of the population and thus distorting one’s perception of
reality. The tendency to be optimistic also has implications in the Economic theory of rationality;
if one is overtly optimistic and tends to discount negative information, it could be said that they
are not acting in a rational manner. Economic theory assumes that individuals are rational and
take into consideration the probability of each event in decision making. This is according to
Bayes’ Rule, which concerns the law of conditional probability based on some knowledge of the
event. Bayes’ Rule also implies that while individuals incorporate desirable information into
their existing beliefs, there is also an aversion to incorporate adverse information (Eil & Rao,
2011) as well as discount the impact of the negative information (Koszegi 2006), which is
consistent with the process of the optimistic learning bias. However, Ulrike Hahn (2014) has
suggested that because human experience is fairly limited and subject to errors because of
bounds on attentional and short-term memory capacities, acting on a lack of information should
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not be taken as a mistaken belief nor as a sign of irrationality. Rather, it is rational that an
individual makes inferences about the world based on their own experience, which is consistent
with a Bayesian perspective on probability. For example, if a Westerner compares themselves to
the rest of the world, they will naturally conclude they are much better off because they do not
face as many adverse events such as war and famine. Especially with reinforcement from the
media from excessive coverage of negative events in the rest of the world, a Westerner may feel
overall more optimistic about their own future compared to others in the world. This optimistic
tendency can carry into optimism studies that primarily use Western individuals in their sample.
Research on general optimism can be traced back to studies on the Pollyanna Principle by
Matlin and Stang, as well as Weinstein’s experiments on unrealistic optimism. The Pollyanna
Principle, termed by Matlin and Stang (1978), is the tendency for individuals to give precedence
to pleasant events over unpleasant ones. This phenomenon has been observed in various
situations, such as recalling pleasant items earlier, recognizing pleasant stimuli faster and
producing more pleasant words in a free association task. A study by Matlin and Gawron (1979)
found that Pollyannaism measures moderately correlated with optimism and happiness, but less
optimistic people had higher expectations for their happiness to improve compared to optimistic
people. Dember and Penwell (1980) noted that, like with any phenomenon, some individuals
deviated from the norm, such as listing negative items before positive ones. They suggested that
those who deviated from the Pollyanna Principle were of a minority group that held pessimistic
outlooks on life, but the lack of an accurate method of measuring optimism and the simplicity of
some of the Pollyanna tasks prevented them from making further inferences.
Weinstein (1980), in his studies on what he termed errors of judgments as unrealistic
optimism, noted that people tend to be self-centered and think of themselves as invulnerable
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compared to their peers. Weinstein outlined several hypotheses, among them motivational
reasons, lack of information, past experiences and controllability for individuals to be
unrealistically optimistic about the future, which represents the pattern of reasoning throughout
time for this phenomenon. The earliest suggestion for unrealistic optimism was that individuals
partake in wishful thinking about their future as a defensive mechanism to protect their sense of
self, and as a consequence they distort reality. Later studies (Miller & Ross 1975: Ross, Greene
& House 1975) indicated that this was partly due to lack of information about other people, as
individuals have more information about themselves readily available compared to others.
Weinstein gathered college students and had them predict their expectations for several future
events. In order to avoid drawing conclusions from simple comparisons between optimistic and
pessimistic responses, Weinstein ensured that his participants made comparative judgments
between their own predictions and their predictions of the population average. He found that
there was a systematic bias in both positive and negative events, but the latter correlated strongly
with optimism, perceived controllability and stereotype salience. Stereotype salience indicated
that individuals typically compare themselves to the stereotypical victim of the negative event
and judged if they had the power to take some preventative action. If they do not fall into the
stereotypical victim category and they believed that they had some power to prevent the event
from occurring, individuals would naturally conclude that there are less susceptible to the
negative than the average person.
Harris and Hahn (2010) however suggest that optimism in previous studies may simply
be a statistical artifact rather than a human bias, and that statistical confounds implies that there
is currently less known about unrealistic optimism as a phenomenon than it is assumed. Harris
and Hahn were concerned by the relatively rare events in what they termed the “direct” method
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of prediction used by Weinstein; these relatively rare events were open to statistical problems
such as scale attenuation, minority undersampling and base rate regressions. Scale attenuation
refers to the lack of range on a scale and as a result causes scores to be clustered towards either
the top or the bottom of the scale. This could be a potential problem because scores would be
distorted and inaccurate. Similarly, minority undersampling causes an inaccurate inference of an
optimistic tendency, as the proportion of people who experience mostly adverse events are likely
to be the ones who are underrepresented in the samples used in any of the studies on unrealistic
optimism. This would naturally result in a skewed pattern that individuals are more optimistic
than not, because there is more data on optimistic individuals. On the other hand, base rate
regression is the statistical tendency for any extreme score to return to the average; this would
cause measurements to appear to have changed significantly when no such thing occurred. Harris
and Hahn suggest that present techniques should be improved in order to avoid the above three
problems so that compelling evidence for the existence of optimism can be provided.
Several of the studies illustrated above demonstrate that humans appear to be optimistic,
or at least show a preference for a positive future. Whether this optimistic tendency is unrealistic
or not would depend on the use of knowledge and experience in making predictions; the
Bayesian perspective on probability would argue that it is entirely rational to do so. Nevertheless,
Harris and Hahn caution that there are several issues with the methodology through which
optimism is measured, namely scale attenuation, minority undersampling and base rate
regressions. In the proposed study, these issues will be avoided through a carefully designed
paradigm that will be used.
Causes of Optimism. Taking into account the research on general optimism and
rationality, there are several theories for causes of optimism, including cognitive, motivational
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and emotional factors, with the most common being cited as a self-serving motivational bias that
protects our self-esteem. Unrealistic optimism appears to encompass a variety of well-known
biases that protects our self-esteem; these biases included the planning fallacy, the illusion of
control, “better than average” effect as well as overconfidence in judgment. Motivational factors
were first assumed to be the biggest mediator in optimism, but since the emergence of research
on cognitive biases there has been a shift towards cognitive factors being a robust source of bias
in judgment.
Early research postulates that some form of motivation is the underlying biasing agent for
individuals being unrealistically optimistic. Motivation for being optimistic takes several forms,
the most commonly cited being self-enhancement and adapting to fear. As optimistic
expectations are fairly impervious to change, they are ideal beliefs as individuals are highly
motivated to protect their self-esteem (Klein & Weinstein, 1997). To even consider any
alternative would be detrimental to one’s self-concept (Alicke, 1985) and thus undesirable.
Motivation to see one in the best possible light is logical as an adaptive measure to ensure
mediation of fear and anxiety in undesirable events (Klein & Weinstein, 1997; Taylor & Armor,
1996). As emotional regulation differs across age, young individuals under the age of 22 are
generally riskier as a result of discounting the importance of undesirable information and being
optimistic about their vulnerability status (Chowdhury, Sharot, Wolfe, Duzel & Dolan, 2012).
The actions of these young individuals are also highly influenced by emotions because of
competing emotional and societal factors as well as a lack of maturity in the brain regions that
regulates emotions and cognitive control. As such, motivations and emotions appear to have
some role in general optimism and the amount of risk individuals are willing to take based on
appraisal of the situation.
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Cognitively, individuals tend to be egocentric, or are self-centered, when comparing
themselves to others in terms of risk (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). In order to explain the
comparative optimism effect where individuals believe that they are less susceptible to negative
events than their peers, Chambers and Windschitl created a framework that suggested nonmotivational mechanisms in the judgment process as well as information processing limitations.
Weinstein (1983) tested whether reducing egocentrism in a study on comparative risk judgment
could subsequently reduce the tendency to be optimistic about the future. By reducing the
egocentrism through providing information on the base rates of risk, Weinstein was able to
reduce the optimism of the participants. Conversely, the participants who did not receive the
information on their peers were more unrealistic in their predictions. One major limitation of
Weinstein’s study is his sample being solely comprised of college students. Adolescents are
generally more limited in their future predictions as they tend to focus more on the present
(McCandless, 1970; Robbins & Bryan, 2004), thus giving unrealistic predictions of the future.
These tendencies of judging oneself in better light than others are well known in the field of
cognitive bias.
Cognitive Biases. The tendency to be optimistic is a form of cognitive bias, which is
defined as pattern of deviation in judgment (Tversky & Kahnerman, 1974). Tversky and
Kahnerman conceptualize cognitive biases as mental shortcuts that individuals utilize to preserve
cognitive economy. These inclinations help individuals to make decisions quickly and efficiently,
which is beneficial in situations that demand prompt action. Derived from one’s perception and
inferences of the world, cognitive biases can lead to irrational conclusions due to their subjective
nature. This failure to be objective may cause errors that result in irrational conclusions with
unaccounted consequences (Haselton, Nettle & Andrews, 2005). There are several cognitive
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biases that contribute to general optimism, such as the representative bias and the availability
heuristic. As suggested by Weinstein (1980), individuals may use the representativeness heuristic
to judge the probability of one experiencing an event through comparison to individuals who
have experienced the event. The individual uses this heuristic to examine the degree to which
they themselves are similar to salient features of the members who have experienced the event,
but in the process ignore the base rate. For example, if one doesn’t see themselves fitting into the
stereotypical image of an alcoholic, the individual will likely conclude that they themselves
won’t become an alcoholic. On the other hand, when individuals utilize the availability heuristic,
they tend to rely and weigh more heavily on recent information as this heuristic relies on easily
and quickly recalled information.
General optimism is thus the result of a variety of factors but specifically the underlying
mechanism of the optimistic learning bias comes from cognitive bias theory. A significant
portion of research into cognitive biases has proven that individuals display a learning pattern
when presented with either desirable or undesirable information (Armor & Taylor 2002; Taylor
& Brown 1988). This ubiquitous behavior can be attributed to the optimistic learning bias, which
occurs when individuals selectively integrate more positive information into their judgment and
disregards the impact of negative information. However, in order to select what information to
process and learn from, we are first required to attend to that piece of information.

Attention
At its simplest, a consequence of not paying attention in the natural world can result in
being killed by a predator. In today’s increasingly distracting world, we are required to pay
attention or else risk a delayed response, missing out on critical information and risk many other
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undesirable outcomes. Attention can be referred to as the process of concentrating on a certain
aspect of information in the environment or the allocation of limited processing resources
(Anderson, 2005). Several studies have indicated that directing attention to a location or to
distinguishing features of a target can evoke the appropriate neural response (Carrasco, 2011).
Specifically, visual attention appears to operate through the sharpening of features of a target in
the visual field (Posner, 1980; Eriksen & James, 1986); this target is then given priority to be
processed. We are however, limited in our ability to attend to details owing to the limited energy
available in the brain and the high-energy cost required for neuronal activity in visual processing
(Lennie, 2003).
Attentional Load. As humans have a limited ability to process information, attention
acts as a buffer in which important or salient stimuli is given priority. The demand for our
attention when undertaking selective information processing is known as attentional load.
Proposing that attention is primarily determined by motivation, Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert
(1997) defined attention as “information processing that involves procedures of selection and
evaluation of motivationally relevant input.”
Attentional load is part of an area of study known as cognitive load, which itself is
largely studied in the field of memory. Miller (1956) first described the limitations of our
memory capacity, and based on such limitations, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) developed a model
on working memory. Baddeley and Hitch proposed that there is a control system known as
working memory whereby information can be manipulated. Cognitive load refers to the amount
of mental effort being utilized in one’s working memory, as working memory is limited in both
its processing and storage capacity. Studies focusing on cognitive load can be traced back to
theories by Sweller (1988) concerning schema usage in problem solving; schemas are mental
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structures of preconceived ideas and aids efficiency in decision making by organization of
information into categories. Sweller theorized that the use of problem solving as a learning tool
is ineffective and instead interferes with learning because it conflicts with the cognitive process
of schema acquisition. Noting that selective attention and limited cognitive processing resources
were the two related mechanisms in learning, Sweller concluded that failure to acquire the
schema during problem solving could plausibly be due to the heavy use of limited cognitive
process and diverted attention.
Attention and Affect. In a previous experiment (Foo, 2014), an affective reinforcer, or
stimuli that have some rewarding or negative valuation, was hypothesized to trigger the
optimistic learning bias. It was suggested that naturally, positive information would trigger a
reward reinforcer signal that stimulates learning, while negative information triggers a
“punishment” signal that would inhibit learning. To manipulate the proposed mechanism, a
positive, negative and neutral symbol was created. The positive symbol was a green sterling
pound sign, the negative symbol a red sterling pound sign and the neutral symbol denoted a
normal learning condition that differed according to the study. Two studies were carried out:
where Study 1 did not have a distinct neutral signal, Study 2 had a grey N to indicate the neutral
signal. In Study 1, although reinforcer type did not cause significant differences in the desirable
news condition, there was a trend towards significance for the undesirable news condition when
combined with the negative signal. However, adding the third neutral symbol caused the results
to become insignificant in Study 2. A plausible explanation for the disappearance of significance
could be that learning from negative news requires more attentional resources and the added
neutral symbol decreased the capacity to attend to the reinforcer. The added condition could have
resulted in some interference with one’s attentional and working memory capacity, thus
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rendering the employment of such additional attention impossible, resulting in a failure in
participants to adjust their beliefs about the future in response to undesirable news. Cognitive
load theory posits that there are two mechanisms influencing attention, which are cognitive and
perceptual. Generally, the manipulation of cognitive load results in reducing optimal
performance due to the lack of resources available to fully attend to the necessary information.
This may be a possible reason for the significance of the positive reinforcer in the bad news
condition in the following study but the disappearance of the significance when an additional
visual stimulus was implemented.
It is plausible that the addition of the extra visual stimuli caused depleted attentional
resources needed to process the affective reinforcer; in order to test this, a manipulation of one’s
visuospatial attention is necessary. Perceptual load theory posits that in low perceptual load
conditions, the irrelevant distractors were perceived, whereas in high perceptual load conditions
the distractors were excluded from perception (Lavie et al. 2004). High perceptual load
conditions were proposed to exhaust the perceptual capacity, as combined with the processing
task relevant stimuli leaves no spare capacity to process the distractor processing. These studies
suggest that in order to manipulate attention in a controlled manner, the visual task used must not
be too straining on one’s perceptual capacity that it causes the participants to completely ignore
the distractor.
Attentional Load Task. Rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) involves the continuous
replacement of items within the same spatial location at high rates and the detection of a target
within the serial presentation. As the RSVP paradigm is used to examine the temporal aspect of
attention due to the control of the speed at the items are being replaced, a rapid sustained visual
presentation will instead be used to affect perceptual capacity. Most studies involving peripheral
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vision and attention involve a visual search for the target; their results can help formulate the
design of the attentional load task to ensure that attentional capacity is truly being strained.
Muller and Findlay (1988) examined the effects of visual attention in relation to single and
multiple displays and found that there were different mechanisms for spatial orienting, which
contributes to different interruptability in uncued stimuli. In order to avoid these differences,
participants will have practice trials where the location of the low and high attentional load will
be shown, thus equalizing the effect of each visual stimuli under a single display. Nuechterlein,
Parasuraman and Jiang (1983) note that sensitivity to visual targets degrades over time due to
high stimulus processing rates and a lack of attentional resources. As such, adequate time must
be given not only for the participants to process the information but to ensure that they have
enough attentional resources throughout the session to process all of the information.

Learning
Learning requires attention in order to effectively process relevant information and store
it in our long-term memory (Ericsson & Kinstchm, 1995; Craik & Lockhart, 1972), and various
studies has demonstrated that desired learning outcomes can be strengthened through
reinforcement (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). While the role of attention in learning and the role of
reinforcement in learning are well established, the role of attention in processing affective stimuli
remains relatively unclear.
Learning and Affect. Recent studies in the area of decision neuroscience have generally
agreed that the brain chooses between its options by first designating a value to all choices under
consideration and then comparing them (Wallis, 2007; Rangel et al., 2008). Lim, O’Doherty and
Rangel (2011) have proposed that this value assignment and comparison process is guided by
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visual attention, based on previous studies demonstrating that exogenous changes in fixation
patterns affected choices (Armel & Rangel, 2008; Gold & Shadlen, 2002). If then the brain
utilizes visual attention to compute and compare values of choices, it is clear that attention plays
some role in the processing of affective stimuli, and in turn can have an influence on learning
from information that has been assigned an affective value.
Learning requires information to be processed into long-term memory. Previous studies
have demonstrated that attention is vital for this process to occur, but the ability to attend is
limited due to the high cost of energy required for visual processing. As a result, humans must be
selective in the details that they choose to attend to and it is theorized that this selectivity occurs
through a value assignment of choices under consideration that primarily operates through visual
attention. The use of rapid sustained visual presentation is proposed so as to allow the processing
of information content and the affective reinforcer without over straining the participant’s
attentional capacity. To summarize, this study will explore the necessity of attention in
processing affective information, where a high attentional load is operationalized by the
extensive use of one’s peripheral vision. High attentional load exerts more attentional resources
away from the affective reinforcer and the information content, leading to a failure to process
both types of content into long-term memory.

The Underlying Mechanism of Optimism: Optimistic Learning Bias
Reality is fraught with undesirable information, yet individuals maintain an optimistic
outlook on their future. It is believed that individuals maintain such optimism through a learning
bias called the optimistic learning bias. Specifically, the optimistic learning bias can be defined
as the tendency for individuals to expect that they are less susceptible to negative events
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compared to the average likelihood (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio & Phelps, 2007). A phenomenon that
is observed throughout all genders, race, nationality and age, the bias is theorized to be due to
individuals selectively integrating more desirable information in their judgments compared to
negative information. Due to this tendency of selectiveness in information type integration, the
optimism bias can be thought of as a learning bias that is inclined to incorporate positive
information more so than negative information. It differs from general optimism in regards to the
optimistic learning bias being more of an underlying mechanism of processing information that
facilitates general optimism. The optimistic learning bias has been observed across gender, race,
culture (Chang, 2000), species (Harding, Paul & Mendl, 2004; Mahetson, 2008) and age
(Isaacowitz, 2005), which imply that it is an integral part of human nature (Sharot, 2011). While
the optimistic learning bias may be beneficial in choice exploration, individuals are also more
unlikely to take precautionary actions against negative events. A paradigm formulated by Sharot,
Korn and Dolan (2011) is the main method used to measure the optimism learning bias.

Figure 1: The belief updating paradigm created by Sharot, Korn and Dolan (2011). In the first
session, feedback on the average likelihood is given after the first estimation is made. Depending
upon desirable or undesirable news that is given, participants updated differentially.
Paradigm. The belief-updating paradigm that is used to measure and test the optimism
bias was developed by Sharot et al. (2011) (see Figure 1 for paradigm design). By challenging
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the belief update system when individuals are faced with new information, Sharot et al. are able
to provide an explanatory framework of how optimism is maintained. The paradigm involves
two sessions; the first where participants were asked to estimate the likelihood of experiencing a
negative event, followed by the presentation of the average likelihood of the event occurring to a
person with a similar socioeconomic status. In the second session that follows immediately after,
the participant again estimates their likelihood of experiencing the negative event. By comparing
the difference between the first estimation and the second estimation, the learning bias of
information update can be assessed. If the first estimation was higher than the average
probability, the average probability information will be taken to be as “good news” and thus
participants are expected to lower their estimation towards the average probability information as
a sign of the optimistic learning bias. In the case where the participant’s first estimation was
lower than the average probability, this would be taken as “bad news” and theoretically they
should raise their second estimation closer to the given probability. However, the optimistic
learning bias in non-depressed individuals leads to a failure to do so, and the difference between
estimations after desirable news and estimations after undesirable news is significant among all
studies that have used this paradigm (Sharot et al. 2011; Moutsiana, Garret, Clarke, Lotto,
Blakemore & Sharot, 2013; Garrett & Sharot, 2014). Estimation errors, which are
operationalized as the difference between the first estimate and the average likelihood, also gives
insight into the differential processing of desirable and undesirable information. The paradigm
has been adapted in several studies by Sharot and her colleagues to determine the robustness of
the optimism bias and the situations that it operates in. Harris and Hahn’s (2011) major concern
that only rare events were used in Weinstein’s studies are avoided as a mix of common and rare
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events are used in Sharot’s paradigm (e.g. card fraud, miss a flight, household accident, back
pain, etc.).
Sharot’s paradigm also takes into consideration alternative explanations for the
differences in estimations between the sessions. Memory, emotional arousal, familiarity and past
experiences were tested as alternative explanations for the optimistic learning bias, and studies
that use the paradigm to assess the optimistic learning bias show that these variables do not
explain differential updating between desirable and undesirable information (Sharot et al. 2011;
Chowdhury, Sharot, Wolfe, Duzel & Dolan, 2013). Differential memory for both types of
information was insignificant, as tested by the difference between the average likelihood and the
remembered average likelihood (Garret et al. 2014). Emotional arousal, familiarity and past
experiences of listed events did not differ between healthy individuals and depressed individuals.
A major limitation in several of the studies discussed below is that they all use this paradigm,
resulting in a lack of convergent validity due to there being no other measure of the optimistic
learning bias.
Properties of the Optimistic Learning Bias. Although the underlying mechanism of
this tendency to learn from more desirable information is unknown, there are several aspects of
this learning bias that have been examined. One of the hallmarks of the optimistic learning bias
is that it appears to operate quickly and efficiently (Kappes & Sharot, 2014). Kappes and Sharot
used a similar paradigm that manipulated the duration of the average likelihood shown and
utilized cognitive load. The average likelihood was either shown for 4 seconds or 500 ms, while
for the cognitive loading condition, participants were asked to either remember a password or not
while viewing the average likelihood information. Both conditions showed that this optimistic
learning bias occurs efficiently.
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In a study of comparison between predictions about oneself and the population, Garret
and Sharot (2014) found that past experience, or the participant’s first estimation and number of
trials, could account for biased updating in base rates of the population. Base rates are
estimations of the population’s average likelihood. Garret and Sharot also found that the valence
dependent updating of self risk reported previously is not contingent on the method by which
trials are labeled as “desirable” or “undesirable”, as this experiment revises the labeling method
by asking participants to define desirable and undesirable trials as well as dividing the trials into
two different ways (estimates of self risk and estimates of base rates). This clarifies the
ambiguity of the information, such as when a participant is given a base rate that is worse than
their self-risk estimate but better than their base rate estimate. This indicates that the optimistic
learning bias exist across different definitions of positive and negative information.
Individual Differences in the Optimistic Learning Bias. The degree of one’s optimism
bias would naturally differ across individuals. Although there is not a significant gender
difference (Sharot et al. 2011), there are significant age differences in both updating of beliefs
and risk behavior. Furthermore, there is one subset of the population does not exhibit the
optimism learning bias; depressed individuals appear to have the ability to mediate both positive
and negative information equally. These studies enable us to judge the degree to which the
optimistic learning bias exists in certain groups, and provides information on specific
demographics to exclude when examining the optimistic learning bias on a deeper level.
Age Differences. One would expect the elderly to have encountered more negative events
compared to adolescents, as is the nature of a long life. Older individuals would face a declining
quality of life due to negative events such as their declining physical and cognitive functioning,
reduced social interaction and the expectation of their demise (Rowe & Kahn, 1987). However,
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research suggests that older adults are less pessimistic than their counterparts (Carstensen et al.
2011) and experience less negative arousal for adverse events such as anticipation of financial
loss (Samanez-Larkin et al. 2007). A recent study by Chowdhury, Sharot, Wolfe, Duzel & Dolan
(2014) examined the relationship between the anterior cingulate cortex, an area of the brain
known to be implicated in depression (Cotter, Mackay, Landau, Kerwin & Everall, 2001), and
the difference in updating of beliefs among ages. Older adults were found to have greater belief
updating compared to younger adults because of a significantly lower update for the undesirable
condition, as well as a greater initial estimation error. While older adults made more memory
errors, the errors were similar for both desirable and undesirable information, indicating that
valence of information was not responsible for any differential memory errors. Additionally,
older adults rated all events as more emotionally arousing and positive events more familiar than
younger adults, suggesting that that the greater update bias in older adults was not due to lack of
engagement or lack of relevance of the task.
Children and adolescents are known to be riskier than adults due to their still developing
frontal lobes that are unable to completely assess risk (Steinberg, 2005). Risky behavior and the
limited effect of campaigns against such behaviors could be explained by the optimism bias, as
they are less likely to take precautionary actions. In a study by Moutsiana, Garret, Clarke, Lotto,
Blakemore and Sharot (2013), it was found that younger age was associated with significantly
inaccurate updating of their perception of vulnerability to undesirable information. Older
individuals typically have higher levels of emotional well being compared to youths, as well as a
decline in their experiences of negative information (Stone et al. 2010). Moutsiana et al. (2013)
compared the results between younger adults and older adults and found that while all
individuals updated better from desirable information more than negative information, there was
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also a marked difference in updating due to age; older participants updated their beliefs less than
younger participants in the undesirable information condition. As both younger and older
individuals updated similarly in response to positive information, this suggests that older adults
had a greater update bias due to the lower update in the negative information condition.
Depressed Individuals. In today’s world, there is an unprecedented rate of depression
(Lambert, 2006), with one in ten adults being diagnosed with depression in the United States
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2011). Studies on depressed individuals
have revealed that they do not have the optimism bias due to a strong ability to mediate both
positive and negative information. As part of the post-scanning questionnaire, Beck’s Depression
Inventory (BDI) was used in the studies to identify the severity of participant’s depression.
Individuals with a BDI score more than 13 were excluded from the studies, as highly depressed
individuals tend to not display any optimistic learning bias (Strunk et al. 2006), making them
inappropriate for determining the conditions in which the optimistic learning bias operates.
More recently, Garret et al. (2014) found that depressed individuals had unbiased
updating of information due to a close coding of negative estimation errors, contrary to the
diminished coding of negative estimation errors by healthy individuals. Depressed individuals
updated their beliefs in response to negative information in a similar manner to desirable
information, suggesting that depressed individuals are more realistic and do not discount bad
news. Emotional arousal, familiarity and past experiences of listed events did not differ between
healthy individuals and depressed individuals, but depressed individuals rated undesirable news
as less aversive than desirable events in contrast to healthy individuals. Additionally, Garret et al.
noted that their study only included moderately depressed individuals and suggested that more
severe depression could cause a negatively bias in update.
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The optimistic learning bias indicates that people selectively choose to learn from more
desirable information compared to undesirable information. While the precise mechanics of how
this bias operates is unknown, it is plausible that attention has a role in the processing of
affective information, as previous studies have indicated that attention is necessary to encode
information into the long-term memory store for learning. In consideration of the appropriate
sample to test the hypothesis of attention mediating affective reinforcement in learning,
depressed individuals, young adolescents under the age of 18 and older adults above the age of
65 will be excluded. These populations cannot be used to test the degree to which attention
mediates affective reinforcement in a normal population as studies have indicated that depressed
individuals appear to lack the optimistic learning bias, while the two extreme ends of the age
range have skewed updating of beliefs.

Proposed Study
An integral part of decision making involves learning from information and integrating
our inferences into our judgment. Information is seldom plainly neutral; our feelings and mood
often color them with a positive or negative affect. Furthermore, people are rarely in a distraction
free environment; without unlimited attentional capacity, we naturally have to filter out the
irrelevant information to not process and focus on the relevant information. Using the optimism
learning bias as a window into an information processing operation that permeates daily life, this
study will examine the relationship between attention, learning and affect.
From a previous study (Foo, 2014), there appears to be a discrepancy between the two
studies conducted in terms of the stimuli that the two participant groups were exposed to. Since
the significance of the positive reinforcer in the undesirable news condition disappeared when
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there was an additional reinforcer condition, it implies that the three different reinforcers
contributed to depleting the attentional resources that were needed to learn from undesirable
news condition. This proposed study will examine the use of attention in order to learn from
affective reinforcers, instead of simple updating through reinforcement.
Sharot’s paradigm assesses update, namely the difference between the participant’s first
estimation and the second estimation. While the updating of one’s belief is important as it
measures learning from information indirectly, it does not take into account the initial estimation
error made before learning the average likelihood. As such, this study will use the difference
between update and the estimation error to examine if individuals adjusted their second
estimation in relation to how much estimation error they made in the first place. This measures
learning more accurately as it takes into account the initial error made and not just updating
one’s beliefs as a proxy for learning. Thus, instead of the normal update (2nd estimation - 1st
estimation) used in Sharot’s paradigm, the update after learning (2nd estimation - average
likelihood) will be used to assess the effect of attentional load on the reinforcers. It is proposed
that under no attentional load, individuals will update their 2nd estimation by a similar amount to
their initial estimation error. Individuals will learn best when they are under not attentional load,
in a desirable news condition and receive a positive reinforcer, but will minimally learn or not at
all under high attentional load when receiving both desirable and undesirable news regardless of
reinforcer valence because there will be an inability to process any information.
Gaining an understanding of how the optimism bias functions and its underlying
mechanism is important in our understanding of human behavior and decision making, as they
are largely influenced by our own expectations and predictions of the future. In particular,
examining the attentional capacity needed to learn from valuations of information is important,
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as there are varied implications for information communication and learning. If attention is not
required to learn from affective reinforcers, then Model 1 is true and affective “tags,” or
information valuation, is processed without attention. However, if it is indeed the case that
attention is required to process both information and the affective tag, then Model 2 is true (see
Figure 2). Regardless of whichever model is accurate, more on the influence of attention on
affective reinforcement will be known.

Figure 2: Model 1 assumes that attention is not required to process an affective tag, while it is
known that information requires attention to be stored into long-term memory. Model 2 assumes
that attention is needed for both information and the affective tag to be processed and stored into
long-term memory. It is proposed that attentional load mediates the affective reinforcer when
learning from desirable or undesirable information, and that a high attentional load would result
in failure to process and learn from the information and the affective tag (Model 2).
Proposed Method
Participants
30 college students (age M = 19.5, SD = 2, female = 15) will be recruited by flyers posted

around campus, Facebook events and classroom advertisement. Participants should be within the
range of 18 to 65 years old. Ideally, participants will be prescreened for any diagnosed
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depression and be excluded. Participants will be compensated $11 for their participation in the
study and will be given class credit if needed.

Materials
General Task Design. The task design was adapted from Sharot, Korn and Dolan (2011).
Using MatLab, a program used for testing models, the randomly presented stimuli will consist of
80 short descriptions of negative life events, such as a family member dying or the chances of
getting osteoporosis (see Appendix A for list of events). Trials are carefully selected to include a
range of common, uncommon and rare negative events. On each trial, participants will be asked
to estimate the likelihood of experiencing the negative event. They will be informed that all the
averages were in a range of 3% to 77%, which is due to a Matlab program limitation that does
not allow for over or underestimation. After participants give their estimation, the average
probability of the event occurring will be shown, with a random chance of a reinforcer appearing.
For each event, the average likelihood of the event was fabricated. Specifically, it will be
programmed so that for half of the trials, participants will receive good news (i.e., the
participant’s estimate was higher than the average likelihood) and for the other 40 trials the
participants will receive bad news (i.e., the participant’s estimate was lower than the average
likelihood). Each news condition will furthermore be paired with a low, high or no attentional
load task. In essence, the screen presented after participants give their first estimation will
contain the average likelihood information, an affective reinforcer and an attentional load
condition (see Figure 2 for overall task flow and permutations of all conditions). After
completing all 80 events, participants were asked once to estimate their chances of experiencing
the negative event in another 80 trials. In this session, they will not see the average likelihoods.
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Figure 2: Task Flow. All participants will go through 80 trials in each session. There will be 40
trials where participants receive desirable information, while the other 40 consist of
undesirable information.

Affective Reinforcers. Each trial will be paired with either a positive or negative
reinforcer that is intended to stimulate or inhibit learning respectively. The positive reinforcer
will be a green dollar symbol with a plus sign in its center that is designed to stimulate learning,
while the negative reinforcer will be a red dollar symbol with a minus sign in its center that is
designed to inhibit learning. This results in two affective conditions with 20 trials each per news
condition. As such, each news condition has 20 trials with a positive reinforcer and 20 trials of a
negative reinforcer (i.e. 20 trials where good news is paired with the reinforcer, 20 trials where
good news is paired with the negative reinforcer, etc.). Participants will be told that these
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symbols are distractors that contributed to their chance of earning or losing 20 cents towards the
extra $4 that could be gained, so that they are motivated to pay attention.
Attentional Load. In order to test if attentional load has an effect on learning from
visually presented affective reinforcers, a visual distractor task that places attentional load onto
participants will be used. Through the use of rapid sustained visual presentation, attentional load
will be increased in three levels to assess its effects on learning.
Each trial will be paired with a low, high or no attentional load. The design of the
attentional load task strains the participant’s peripheral vision further as the load increases, thus
utilizing more of their attentional resources. Participants will be told that there will be a random
amount of trials where they will be asked to report the number of dots that appear on the screen.
In the low attentional load condition, a semi circle consisting of small dots will be displayed at
the bottom of the affective reinforcer, so the participant only exerts a minimal amount of
attentional resources to count the number of dots that appear. In the high attentional load
condition, the semi circle of dots will appear above the average likelihood number, marginally
further away from the center of the screen (see Figure 3 for feedback screen design). This
ensures that participants have to devote more attention to their peripheral vision in order to count
the amount of dots. Additionally, to ensure that the task does not impact learning overall, only on
randomly selected trials will participants be asked to count the number of dots that appear during
the presentation of the average likelihood. Participants will be asked to input the number of dots
that appeared in only 8 trials. These trials will appear at random but specifically for each unique
interaction between the variables (i.e., once where good news, positive reinforcer and low
attentional load interacts, once where good news, positive reinforcer and high attentional load
interacts, etc.).
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Figure 3: The feedback screen will show the average likelihood, an affective reinforcer and an
attentional load condition. In the left screen, the positive reinforcer appears below the average
likelihood, and there is a low attentional load as the dots are closer towards the reinforcer. The
right side will appear under a negative reinforcer condition and when there is a high attentional
load, as demonstrated by the dots being further away from the reinforcer.
Learning. Participants will be asked to estimate their likelihood of encountering a
specific negative event twice: once before being shown the average likelihood information and
once after. The update in their belief is computed by the difference between their 2nd estimation
and their 1st estimation.
Update = 2nd Estimation - 1st Estimation
The estimation error is calculated by the difference between the average likelihood given
and the participant’s first estimation.
Estimation Error = Average Likelihood - 1st Estimation
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Learning is operationalized as the difference between the update and the estimation error.
| Learning | = Update - Estimation Error
| Learning | = [2nd Estimation - 1st Estimation] - [Average Likelihood - 1st Estimation]
| Learning | = 2nd Estimation - Average Likelihood
This operationalization of learning takes into account the initial estimation error made by
the participant. If the participant adjusts their 2nd estimation exactly by the amount that their first
estimation was wrong by, they have accurately remembered their initial error and have learned
the average likelihood information. Failure to learn thus occurs when participants are unable to
recall their estimation error and subsequently fail to adjust their estimation in accordance with
the average likelihood information.
Optimism and depression. Participants will complete the Life Orientation Test (LOT-R)
that measures trait optimism, as well as the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) to measure the
severity of their depression as part of the post-scanning questionnaire. The BDI consists of 21
multiple-choice self-report questions with items including thoughts about suicide, punishment
and loss of pleasure. Individuals with a BDI score more than 13 will be excluded from the
analysis as a score of below 13 implies mild to no depression, while highly depressed individuals
tend to not display any optimism bias (Strunk et al. 2006), making them inappropriate for
determining whether attention mediates the affective reinforcers when learning from desirable or
undesirable information.
Properties of stimuli. At the end of the second session, participants will given a
questionnaire to complete, where they will rate the events on five scales: vividness, familiarity,
prior experience, arousal and negativity (see Appendix B for questions). Each scale can be given
a score from 1 to 6, where 1 indicates low arousal, no experience, or not negative while 6
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denoted high arousal, experienced and extremely negative. When participants are finished, they
will also be given a debriefing questionnaire on their thoughts about the study.

Procedure
The researcher will meet the participants at the lobby of the Psychology Department.
Participants will be brought up to the experiment location and told that the study concerned
decision making under distractions. The researcher will remind participants that they will be paid
$7 for their time and they will have the chance of winning up to $4 extra based on luck. If
participants need credit, they will also receive it in addition to the $11 that will be ultimately
received.
Participants will be assigned to cubicles and asked to sign the informed consent forms.
Once they return the forms, participants will be told that they would first have some practice
trials to get acclimated to the format of the program, after which they will be questioned on the
instructions to ensure comprehension. Participants will be asked about the range of numbers that
could be entered, the method of entering a single digit and the meaning of the symbols. Once the
researcher is assured that the participants understood the instructions, the study will begin.
First, participants will estimate the likelihood of all 80 negative life events and receive
average likelihood information. Regardless of the news condition (i.e., good news or bad news),
participants saw a reinforcer (i.e., positive or negative) and a type of attentional load (i.e. low,
high or none). Immediately following this first session, participants once again estimated the
likelihood of all the 80 trials; this time, they will not receive average likelihood information.
Thereafter, they will answer the post-scanning questionnaire consisting of the LOT-R, the BDI,
and the ratings of the stimuli. Finally, they will be given the debriefing questionnaire. After
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completing the debriefing questionnaire, participants will be debriefed and assured that the
average likelihood statistics are fabricated. The participants will also be given resources on
positivity and optimism. All participants will then be paid and thanked for their time.

Ethics
The proposed study examines the effect of attentional load on an individual’s optimistic
learning bias under reinforcement. Although the participants of the study are not from a
protected population, only individuals who have not been diagnosed with depression can
participate in this study as past research has shown that depressed individuals do not display an
optimistic learning tendency. Furthermore, participants with a high BDI score of 13 will be
excluded as a score of 13 and above implies some form of depression. The exclusion of
depressed individuals is necessary as they are unsuitable for examining the normal parameters of
the optimistic learning bias.
There is some level of minimal risk involved in this study, as there may be fatigue arising
from staring at the computer screen for an hour and the negative subject matter being distressing.
It is unlikely that individuals are subjected to a constant stream of undesirable information and
asked to imagine their own probability of encountering such negative events for an hour in daily
life. However, if we can identify the specific conditions that the optimistic learning bias operates
in, we can optimize learning outcomes and prevent unaccounted for consequences in the future.
The use of affective reinforcers can also potentially help stimulate desired outcomes or inhibit
undesirable behaviors, which would be beneficial in a vast array of learning situations. Knowing
the amount of attentional load that would prevent individuals from benefiting from these
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affective reinforcers will also be advantageous as this knowledge ensures that we derive the
optimal amount of learning from affective reinforcers.
Participation in the study is voluntary and all information collected is anonymous and
confidential. The study will be advertised as offering $7 for participation, with the opportunity of
gaining an extra $4 based on random chance. The initial amount of $7 offered is similar to the
minimum wage paid to college students for an hour of work; as the study would take at least an
hour, this compensation seems fair and would encourage voluntary participation. Furthermore, as
the amount is not excessive, it will not have an overjustification effect on the performance of the
participants. The chance of gaining up to $4 provides motivation for participants to focus on the
task and the affective reinforcers. However, all participants will receive the extra $4 as a surprise
monetary compensation would help in removing the negative feelings arising from the study.
Finally, the data collected in this study will be anonymous and confidential, as the participants
are not asked to give their name during their session and are instead given a reference number in
the MatLab program. The collection of consent forms will be kept in a secured location.
Sharot’s paradigm involves presenting participants with various negative events and
asking them to estimate their probability of experiencing an event. Post scanning questionnaires
also ask the participants to rate on a scale their familiarity, vividness, past experience and
perceived negativity with the event. Naturally, some individuals are able to imagine in greater
detail their likelihood of encountering some of the events due to past experiences or familiarity
with the event, which could be disturbing to them. In order to mitigate any negative side effects
from the prolonged session of being exposed a constant stream of undesirable information and
using the information to make a judgment of their own future, participants will be paid the full
sum of $11 regardless of performance on the task. Additionally, participants will be told that the
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average probability numbers are fabricated and will be given information on resources about
positivity and optimism. Asking participants to go through this process of estimating their
likelihood of experiencing a variety of negative events is necessary to examine the optimism bias
because it provides an explanation for how individuals can maintain optimism in the face of
reality, which has undesirable information that may undermine an individual’s beliefs.
The study involves minimal deception, as participants are not told the purpose of the
affective reinforcers and are instead told that they are random symbols that tabulate their chances
of winning the extra $4. This ensures that their performance is not intentionally biased towards
learning better in the positive reinforcer condition or worse in the negative reinforce condition,
which is essential in proving that the optimistic learning bias can be manipulated with affective
reinforcers and that it operates on an unconscious level. Participants will be debriefed about this
deception after the study. Overall, the benefits of learning more about the optimistic learning bias
and the effects of attention on affect outweighs the minimal risk of exposure to a series of
thoughts on negative events and the resulting slight discomfort that can be reversed.

Expected Results
It is proposed that attention mediates the affective reinforcers that can stimulate or inhibit
the optimism learning bias. Learning was operationalized by the difference between the
participant’s second estimation and the average likelihood, as this follows that if one learned
more, then the update (2nd Estimation - 1st Estimation) should be closer to the initial estimation
error (Average Likelihood - 1st Estimation). As there are 80 trials in total with 12 conditions,
each participant will have an average score taken from 7 trials for each learning condition
depending on the news valence (good or bad news), type of affective reinforcer (positive or
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negative) and the level of attentional load that will be imposed (none, low or high). One trial
from each actual attentional load condition that asked the participant to perform the counting task
will be discarded in the final analysis of main and interaction effects, thus each condition will
have an average value from 6 trials. The discarded trials, which will be one for each of the eight
attentional load conditions (i.e., good news with a positive reinforcer and high attentional load,
good news with a positive reinforcer and a low attentional load etc.) will be compared to learning
under no attentional load and when not asked to recall the amount of dots on the task.
To ensure that participants in this sample do demonstrate an optimistic bias in learning, a
one-sample t test that compares the means of learning under good news and bad news will be
carried out. Based on previous studies (Sharot et al., 2011), it is proposed that there is a
significant effect of news valence on learning, F(1,29) = x, p = y, indicating that participants
updated their estimates differently based on the type of news they received.
Based on a previous study (Foo, 2014), the affective reinforcers were found to trend
towards significance. With an adjustment to the paradigm, a within subject repeated measure that
compares the difference between the means of learning under a positive reinforcer and learning
under a negative reinforcer will be carried out. It is proposed that there will be a significant effect
of affective reinforcer type, F(1,29) = x, p = y, which indicates that participants learned
differently based on the type of affective reinforcer they are exposed to.
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Figure 4: It is proposed that under high attentional load, the effect of learning under affective
reinforcers did not differ significantly among news valence conditions, as per Model 2.
A three way factorial ANOVA will be employed to evaluate the effects of attentional
load, news valence, and affective reinforcer upon learning. It is proposed that there will be a
statistically significant three-way interaction between news valence, affective reinforcer and
attentional load, F(2, 29) = X, p = Y, as well as significant effects for news valence, F(2, 29) = X,
p = y; affective reinforcer F(2, 29) = X; attentional load F(2, 29) = X; news valence x affective
reinforcer, F(2, 29) = X, p = y; and affective reinforcer x attentional load, F(2, 29) = 6.01, p
= .015, with a MSE of X for each of these effects. In order to determine whether attention
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mediates the effect of affective reinforcers, the interactions were investigated further by
evaluating the simple main effects of attentional load separately for no, low and high attentional
load. High attentional load is proposed to significantly cause failure to learn (M = X, SD = Y)
than low attentional load (M = X, SD = Y) and no attentional load (M = X, SD = Y) (see Figure 4
for differences in failure to learn across news valence, affective reinforcer and attentional load
conditions).
To determine if there was a difference in effect of performing the attentional load task or
not, a within subject repeated measures was carried out. The estimate marginal means for the
attentional load task (M = X, SD = Y) and the no attentional load task (M = X, SD = Y) differed
significantly, F(1,29) = x, p = y, indicating that participants did not learn when asked to perform
the attentional load task.
Discussion
Consistent with past findings (Sharot et al. 2011), the proposed results indicate that
people updated better under desirable than undesirable information as well as updated better
under a positive reinforcer than negative reinforcer. It is proposed that the main hypothesis of
attention mediating the affective reinforcers is supported by these results, which indicates that
Model 2 is true and that learning under affective reinforcement requires attention.
Provided that we accept that there is an optimistic tendency of integrating more desirable
information into our judgment compared to undesirable information, and that this can be affected
by the amount of attentional load one is under, Model 2 is accurate and there are several
implications for learning that can be extrapolated. If there is absolutely no effect of the affective
reinforcer regardless of desirability of the information when under high attentional load, it is then
necessary that the amount of distraction in the environment be reduced in order for one to benefit
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from affective information. Furthermore, as there is a significant difference in failure to learn
between performing the counting task and not, this implies that one cannot be overloaded with
additional tasks otherwise no information will be processed. For example, communicating
undesirable information effectively would be best if the person is under minimal distraction, thus
allowing for the full use of the attentional capacity to process the undesirable information and the
affect associated with the information. This can be seen in a health setting, where communicating
information on risk of a disease and preventative action to a patient must be done without
distractions to allow for full attention on encoding the information, especially since the
information on risk may have a negative affect while preventative action information may come
with a positive affect. Patients should first process the information on risk, and then after a delay,
the preventative action information, because it is known that more attention is needed to learn
from undesirable information with a negative affect. If patients were given the information
sequentially without the chance of their attentional resources to be replenished, the information
on preventative care could be remembered wrongly due to the lack of attentional capacity to
fully process the affective information, and patients will not learn from such information.
Yet, even if the opposite was true and Model 1 is instead accurate, this model informs us
that affective information is processed separately from regular information and does not require
attention to be processed into the long-term memory store. This implies that affective
information may be influenced by other factors besides attention, perhaps at a deeper
unconscious level. Nevertheless, there are several limitations of this study that may reduce the
real world applications of these results.
Sharot’s paradigm assumes a Frequentist perspective on events in that it is assumed
people judge event outcomes as being equally likely of occurring. However, her sample may
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have encountered more optimistic priors compared to a larger sample, which would naturally
show an optimistic tendency when learning from information as an extension of Bayesian
probability. This may be a problem in the paradigm that is used to show that attention mediates
the affective reinforcer, because the sample appears to be naturally optimistic regardless of any
condition. A further limitation of the task design is the unverifiability of whether the attentional
load conditions truly exerted the participant’s visual attentional capacity. As participants are
unaware of the purpose of the attentional load task, a manipulation check would not suffice in
determining if the task had any effect on attention.
Future studies could examine other elements of attentional capacity that could have an
influence on processing the affective tag. According to Baddeley’s model of working memory, a
phonological loop that is required for rehearsal of information can be disrupted and encode
information wrongly into long term memory. Instead of using a visual attention task, an auditory
task could be used in place to examine the effects of auditory disruptions, which also occurs
frequently in the real world. If we are able to fully determine the influence of attention on
processing affective information, then we would be able to communicate information more
effectively. This would hopefully cause less risky behavior deriving failure to learn as a result of
failure to encode both information content and affective reinforcement.
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Appendix A
List of Negative Events
	
  

Alzheimer's disease
Abnormal heart rhythm
Anxiety disorder
Arteries hardening (narrowing of blood
vessels)
Artificial joint
Asthma
Autoimmune disease
Being cheated by husband/wife
Being convicted of crime
Blood clot in vein
Bone fracture
Cancer (of digestive
system/lung/prostate/breast/skin)
Car stolen
Card fraud
Chronic high blood pressure
Death before 70
Death before 80
Death by infection
Dementia
Depression
Diabetes (type 2)
Disease of spinal cord
Domestic burglary
Drug abuse
Epilepsy
Fraud on internet purchases
Gallbladder stones
Having a stroke
Having fleas/lice
Heart failure
Hepatitis A or B
Hernia (rupture of internal tissue wall)
From Sharot et al. 2011

Herpes
House vandalized
Household accident
Infertility
Irritable bowel syndrome (disorder of the
gut)
Kidney stones
Knee osteoarthritis (causing knee pain and
swelling)
Limb amputation
Liver disease
Migraine
Miss a flight
More than £30000 debts
Mouse/rat in house
Obesity
Of bullying at work (nonphysical)
Osteoporosis (reduced bone density)
Serious hearing problems
Severe injury due to accident (traffic or
house)
Severe insomnia
Severe teeth problems when old
Sexual dysfunction
Sport related accident
Theft from person
Theft from vehicle
Ulcer
Victim of mugging
Victim of violence at home
Victim of violence by acquaintance
Victim of violence by stranger
Victim of violence with need to go to A&E
Witness a traumatizing accident
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Appendix B
Post Scanning Questionnaire
How vividly can you imagine this event?
How familiar is this event regardless whether you have experienced it before? (from TV, friends,
movies and so on)
Has this event happened to you before?
How emotionally arousing is this event?
How negative is this event for you?
From Sharot et al. 2011

